Emirates A345 tail strike

[damien b]

From the ABC

A plane has been forced to return to Melbourne Airport overnight after smoke was noticed in the cabin.

The tail of the Emirates flight struck the tarmac as it was taking off late last night, and later returned to the airport after smoke was noticed inside the aircraft.

An airport spokesman says the plane landed safety and none of the 225 passengers were injured.

The cause of the smoke appearing is not yet known.



There are photos of the damage on PPrune and it looks like the fuselage skin was 'removed' in places as some stringers are certainly visible. Some more information is on the site as well including a possible heavy landing and damage to the landing gear.

link to the pprune photos here http://www.pprune.org/d-g-reporting-points/366754-ek407-tailstrike-ml.html

The ATSB report may be a intersting read when its released.

[Rhys Xanthis]

those pictures seem to show some pretty significant damage!

now start the rumours lol

[Owen H]

Oops.

[Philip Argy]

This report is from the Avherald at http://avherald.com/h?article=416c9997&opt=0



Accident: Emirates A345 at Melbourne on Mar 20th 2009, tail strike and overrun on takeoff
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Mar 20th 2009 23:11Z, last updated Saturday, Mar 21st 2009 08:12Z
An Emirates Airlines Airbus A340-500, registration A6-ERG performing flight EK-407 from Melbourne,VI (Australia) to Dubai (United Arab Emirates) with 225 people on board, experienced a tail strike on takeoff from Melbourne's runway 16 (length 3657 meters/12000 feet) at around 22:30 local (12:30Z), hit the runway end lights and the localizer antenna past the end of runway 16. The airplane climbed out safely, went to dump fuel overhead the ocean at Port Phillip Bay but returned for an immediate emergency landing when smoke started to fill the cabin about 30 minutes after takeoff. The airplane landed heavily on Melbourne's runway 34 and was able to taxi to the apron after being checked out by emergency services.

Severe abrazions occured to the tail skin and several access panels were ripped off during the tailstrike, the landing reportedly caused additional damage to the gear.

The Melbourne Airport confirmed, that several runway end lights were damaged in the accident, too, and needed to be replaced. NOTAMs (NOTices for AirMen) state, that the ILS runway 16 will not be available until March 23rd: "F2248/09 - ILS RWY16 'IMS' FREQ 109.7 NOT AVBL. 20 MAR 16:10 2009 UNTIL 23 MAR 07:00 2009 ESTIMATED. CREATED: 20 MAR 16:10 2009"

In daylight Saturday morning it was established, that the airplane was still on the ground when it passed the runway end during takeoff, according gear tracks were found in the soft ground past the runway end.




PPRune mentions a rumour that freight shifted to the rear on rotation - that potentially adds an interesting element to the factual matrix and perhaps shifts the focus to the loadmaster more than the flight crew.

[Daniel M]

I always was under the impression that Airbus (FBW) aircraft weren't able to over-rotate, amongst other things?

[Chris Griffiths]

I always was under the impression that Airbus (FBW) aircraft weren't able to over-rotate, amongst other things?
I believe all airliners have a minimum "unstick" capability that often entails scraping the tail.
The choice between grabbing a whole lot of elevator, scraping the tail then dumping some Jet-A and returning to discuss the issue or ending up as a smoking pile of wreckage in the gullies of Keilor Park.. pretty simple decision in many ways.

The question why the 'bus had not become an Airbus by the end of the runway.. interested on the real answer to that.

Cheers

[Mike W]

I'm thinking about thousands of litres of Kerosine dumped "overhead the ocean at Port Phillip Bay" :mad:

[Philip Argy]

Each report seems to raise more questions than it answers. Right now over weight and unbalanced load seems plausible, but where the hell were they at V1? An RTO might have been safer than a tail scrape, but I agree a tail scrape was better than Keilor Park or southbound on the Calder Freeway.

[Chris B.]

Mike,

When fuel dumping in flight is required, it must (where possible) conduct a controlled dump in clear air above 6000ft and in an area nominated by ATC.

This requirement means that from above 6000ft the fuel would have vapourised before hitting the ground/water.

[Owen H]

Phillip, unfortunately if they were overweight, then V1 is a useless figure. It is highly dependant on weight, so when they got to their V1 point, depending on if Emirates calculate it as a "stop" or "go" speed, it may well have already been too late to stop on the runway.

That said, in order to achieve this the aircraft would have to be a LOT heavier than they thought, or a very significant tailwind above what they had calculated as they tried to get airborne (eg windshear). An extra 5 tonne or so is unlikely to cause this.

If the load shifted during rotate, they may not have had any notice until they were trying to actually get airborne, in which case there isn't much they can do but try and wrestle it into the air and make it fly. That said, the troubling part is that it used up every inch of runway (and a few more!). Freight shifting could certainly cause a tailstrike, but I can't see how it would lengthen the takeoff by the rather signficant amount that it did.

Mike W, would you rather them attempt to dump fuel over a clear area (where possible above a height where it vapourises before it reaches the ground) or would you rather jeapodise the safety of an aircraft? The jet needed to dump fuel to return. Its not ideal, but when it has to be done, it has to be done.

[Grahame Hutchison]

The aircraft was in one of the standoff bays when I arrived in Melbourne on Saturday morning, it is still in the same place today, tug attached, as I wait for my flight back to Sydney.

Guess they will have to work out were to put it for a much longer stay than normal.

[Karl M]

Aircraft was parked down at G6 (freight ramp) from early Saturday Morning.

I think you saw the other EK flight at the stand off bay Grahame.

ERG this morning was parked inside one of the John Holland hangers this morning, nose facing out, with hanger doors 3/4 closed.

Now it is parked outside, down the southern end of the hangers, facing south.

[Raymond Rowe]

Was outside facing south this afternoon.It had a security guard sitting right underneath where the damage was.

[Mike W]

Mike,

When fuel dumping in flight is required, it must (where possible) conduct a controlled dump in clear air above 6000ft and in an area nominated by ATC.

This requirement means that from above 6000ft the fuel would have vapourised before hitting the ground/water.

Thanks Chris. I didn't realise that's what would happen and I had visions of an oil slick like the one in Queensland recently.

Cheers, I feel better now.

[Chris B.]

No worries, that's what it's all about! ;)

[Martin Buzzell]

The question why the 'bus had not become an Airbus by the end of the runway.. interested on the real answer to that.

Cheers

This is what I want to know as well. I surprised the media hasn't picked up on how close this was to a major disaster. I know I shouldn't speculate, but the over rotation could be that they saw the end of the runway coming up and just rotated just to get airborne at the minimum unstick speed.

There's talk of an engine failure as well, just before the tail scrap. So I'm waiting for a few answers.

[Greg McDonald]

From another source: It hit the runway end lights and the localizer antenna past the end of runway 16 and several access panels were ripped off during the tailstrike, the landing reportedly caused additional damage to the gear.

In daylight Saturday morning it was established, that the airplane was still on the ground when it passed the runway end during takeoff, according gear tracks were found in the soft ground past the runway end.

Very close to a MAJOR disaster!!

[Mark Grima]

Hasn't been a real good 2 or 3 days for aviantion has it? Am also very very surpriosed by the lack of media interest in this, I had no idea about it until logging on today. I'll refrain from saying anything else but I think were are all probably having similar thoughts about the interest this would of caused had this been another airline involved?

Anyway, what I am really interested about is the use of a "Maltese Cross" as mentioned on the PPrune forum. What is it and what is it used for?

Main reason for being interested is that I am Maltese and have a Maltese cross tattooed on my back :-) Have never come across it from a aviation point of veiw though!

Cheers

M

[NickN]

It seems there was no opportunity for a RTO at that late stage, the end of the runway would have been so close by the time the decision was required they have would have been foced to take-off regardless of what had failed or otherwise or they would have ended up as a smouldering wreck.

[Tony P]

Mark,

The "Maltese Cross" is an indication on the flight instruments called a Sidestick order indicator.

This is an abstract from the Joburg incident they talk about on PPRUNE which explains it a little.

Moreover, the captain had been acquainted with an unofficial procedure, mentioned as a "tip" in training, to help determine how much backward pressure on the sidestick controller was needed to rotate the aircraft. The input was two-thirds backstick. But what equates to two-thirds? He had been told during training that the "iron cross" symbol shown as part of the sidestick order indicator (SSOI) on the primary flight display (PFD) can be used for this purpose. The captain had been advised to move the stick so that the cross on the PFD would be at 9 degrees on the pitch scale. (A pitch up of 13.5 degrees will result in a tailstrike on a loaded A340-300, so 9 degrees would provide the attitude to take off with adequate margin against tailstrike.)

Here's the problem: the cross is meant to be used on the ground only for the flight controls check, and for the first officer to monitor the sidestick inputs of the pilot flying during the initial takeoff roll. The cross moves relative to four right-angle marks denoting maximum lateral and longitudinal sidestick deflection. As Airbus cautions, "The sidestick position symbol was not designed to be used during takeoff rotation."

In fact, the SSOI disappears from the display when the weight is removed from the main landing gear. However, this technique of employing the SSOI to determine the amount of backstick was suggested during training, and indeed it had worked in the simulator. However, as the CAA report notes, after performing takeoffs in the Emirates simulator, it "was not able to present an exact representation of the reaction of the aircraft during the takeoff conditions similar to the incident flights ... In each case, the simulator `aircraft' took off without incident."

The overrun is tied to another aspect of the SSOI. When the aircraft rotates, the horizon line (together with its pitch scale) moves down on the PFD. If a pilot moves the cross associated with the SSOI down with respect to the horizon, after rotation the aircraft will not remain pitched up to unstick and climb. This is because the SSOI is referenced to the fixed travel limit marks, not the artificial horizon. As the CAA report states, "Maintaining a 9-degree pitch using the SSOI referenced to the horizon on the PFD after rotation will produce an approximate aircraft pitch of 5 degrees."

And that's what happened in this incident. At rotation, the captain eased off on the backstick, and the first officer thought he was taking the action to avoid a tailstrike. The airplane rumbled off the end of the runway, smashed through a row of runway end/approach lights, and went about 650 feet before finally getting airborne when the captain reapplied backstick and also applied takeoff go-around (TOGA) power.

Hope that helps.

[Robert Zweck]

Am also very very surprised by the lack of media interest in this,

M



Quite simple, really

It wasn't a Qantas Airbus

[NickN]

.... and it wasn't flying over a low frequency transmission point in remote WA to add to the speculation.

The media could report on this, but there isn't much more they can add to sensationalize the story. Nobody was injured, and because it was late at night the drama had unfolded before camera crews could rush to the gate to interview terrified passengers. This one was just too boring to report.

[Andrew P]

....

The media could report on this, but there isn't much more they can add to sensationalize the story. .

yes - question the competence of the flight crew!!!

[Andrew McLaughlin]

The media could report on this, but there isn't much more they can add to sensationalize the story.
No, not after its done its rounds on internet forums such as this and PPruNe and others...what more could the media possibly add!?!

So, what was it Nick...?

Nobody was injured...
...because it was late at night the drama had unfolded before camera crews could rush to the gate to interview terrified passengers...
...or...
This one was just too boring to report.

Let's get real folks - of course there's going to be much more interest in it if it's Qantas...we're in Australia and QF IS the flag carrier after all! Plus, Qantas is a publicly owned company so therefore it may have ramifications on its share price, whereas EK is a foreign carrier. There's probably a 10-fold level of interest amongst Joe Public when something happens to Qantas, compared to that of a foreign carrier which would really only interest the trade media and enthusiasts such as ourselves.

I'm not saying it's right, but it's just the way it is!

[Tony P]

What if they were Australian Pilots?? (I don't know if they were or not).

I don't think you realise just how close it came to disaster. Read the Joburg incident.

[NickN]

yes - question the competence of the flight crew!!!

Hard to say at this stage if the crew were at fault although we could speculate there was some sort of human error somewhere along the line.

[Owen H]

This one has definately been "under reported", although that isn't a bad thing for the industry. The less media getting the facts wrong the better.

That said... I think it deserved more reporting than it has got. This was definately a close one... probably the closest we've come to a major crash in Aus for a while.

Regardless of what has caused the issue (no doubt that it will be revealed in good time), the crew has responded appropriately by keeping the aircraft close to the aerodrome while dumping fuel, permitting a very quick return if it was required (which ultimately happened).

They didn't attempt to pressurise the aircraft and continue, unlike some other carriers. (Not that they would have made it very far this time).

So even if human error caused the tailstrike (we don't know what caused it yet, and it certainly doesn't point to the pilots yet) they flew the aircraft appropriately in an emergency, so kudos to them.

[Philip Argy]

Here's a fairly dramatic YouTube of an A380 minimum take off speed test with a tail strike for good measure - it doesn't initially look like over rotation from the camera angle but it obviously is:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dhCnGMKw1I&feature=related

[Philip Argy]

And here's an interesting document:
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/195.pdf

[Tony P]

Here's a fairly dramatic YouTube of an A380 minimum take off speed test with a tail strike for good measure - it doesn't initially look like over rotation from the camera angle but it obviously is:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dhCnGMKw1I&feature=related


Not really relevant to this issue at hand. Nice video just the same. They intentionally put the tail of the aircraft on the ground. You can find it for every late passenger aircraft during their testing phase (747,777). They have special tail bumpers installed and it is to find the "minimum unstick speed.".

In relation to the A380, I seem to recall that they burnt through the bumper and the aircraft skin on one of the first tests. I'm sure someone can confirm that.

[Torin Wilson]

In relation to the A380, I seem to recall that they burnt through the bumper and the aircraft skin on one of the first tests. I'm sure someone can confirm that.

You are right about that, it was shown on the NatGeo shows that followed the A380 program.

[Ross Corrigan]

Flightglobal is reporting that the pilots of the ill fated Emirates A345 tail strike at Tullamarine have resigned however still no info on what happened.

Link (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/01/324648/pilots-resign-after-emirates-a340-500-accident.html)

[Peter JB]

OK well try this from The Herald Sun tonight:

EXCLUSIVE: A FULLY-LADEN jet came only centimetres from crashing at Melbourne Airport, it has been revealed.

Aviation officials say last month's accident involving an Emirates plane carrying 225 passengers was the closest thing to a catastrophic plane crash Australia has ever experienced.

The Sunday Herald Sun can reveal the plane, bound for Dubai, used all of the 3600m-long runway 16, but failed to become airborne until the last second, when the pilots pulled its nose up so sharply it smashed its tail into the ground at the end of the runway.

It was less than 70cm from the ground when it wiped out airport strobe lights 170m from the end of the runway.

It then took out a navigation antennae before barely clearing the airport's boundary fence half a kilometre away.

"It was as close as we have ever come to a major aviation catastrophe in Australia," one aviation official said.

Took a fair while for this to get front page!

[Nigel C]

Resigned or pushed out...

After reading the above post, stressed out?:confused:

[Kieran Wells]

saw Peters' post on the news.com.au website this morning as "National breaking news"...
What a joke being breaking, as it was reported on other websites including $ydney morning herald the day after it happened...

[James B]

Was also on the CH7 Sunrise news ticker thingy this morning. I tought there might be some more news on this or a report release ... apparently not :rolleyes:

[AdamB]

The Sunday Telegraph in Sydney ran a very small story in todays paper, just a couple paragraphs & it appeared a fair way in, somewhere around page 15, not exactly page one. Their website had a much larger, more in depth article.

From the Daily Telegraph / Sunday Telegraph website:

A FULLY-LADEN jet came only centimetres from crashing at Melbourne Airport last month, it has been revealed.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has placed it in the most serious category of aircraft mishap available to it - an accident, rather than an incident.

An ATSB investigation update shows the accident was labelled a "significant event" by investigators, who also listed damage to the aircraft as "substantial".

"During the take-off the aircraft's tail scraped the runway surface. Subsequently smoke was observed in the cabin," the report says.

A Sunday Herald Sun investigation has confirmed that the flight - EK407 to Dubai - almost failed to become airborne and barely made it over the airport perimeter fence, half a kilometre away.

Damage to the $220 million plane is so severe that the airline is considering writing it off rather than repairing it.

The fully-laden Airbus A340-500 was believed to have been travelling about 280km/h when it reached the end of the runway without becoming airborne.

At the last minute, the two pilots "rotated" the plane - or pulled its nose up into a steep ascent - causing its tail to crash into the end of the runway.

Despite its steep climb, the plane was still so low that it wiped out strobe lights that were only 70cm high and positioned 170m from the end of the runway.

It then took out an antenna, believed to be near a small building, before barely making it over the 2.44m wire perimeter fence.

Aviation expert Dick Smith said something had gone badly wrong.

"It's the closest thing to a major aviation accident in Australia for years," he said.

"The people (passengers) are incredibly lucky, it was an overrun where the plane didn't get airborne."

Mr Smith said Emirates was a "very good airline" and it was strange the pilots had resigned immediately after the accident.

"Emirates' standards are very high and they have a lot of Australian pilots," he said.

"What I'm startled by is that there hasn't been a more immediate announcement. We should get some urgent advice from the ATSB. This is one of the most serious accidents you can imagine."

A Melbourne Airport spokeswoman confirmed the size of the strobe lights, which are on a grassed area between the end of the runway and the perimeter fence, which runs alongside Operations Rd.

"The height of the runway strobe lights is 0.7m above ground level," she said.

[Greg McDonald]

According to rumours out of Emirates Airlines the crew may have mistyped a 2 instead of 3 in the weight data entered into the FMS, so that the FMS computed takeoff data for the airplane 100 tons lighter than it actually was.

Emirates Airlines decided on Apr 21st, that the airplane will be repaired in Melbourne to a point, where it can perform an unpressurized ferry to Airbus Industries in Toulouse, where repairs will be completed.

[Philip Argy]

Please refrain from quoting the whole previous post in your post, it is not necessary, thank you - mod

How would that data entry error go unnoticed or undetected? And how would it result in the tail strike? Could it be as simple as an incorrect rotation velocity calculation?

On the second point, what's the highest altitude for a non-pressurised ferry flight? Would the crew wear oxygen masks or would they simply stay below 10,000 ft?

[Owen H]

Philip, I'll try to explain it the best I can.

There are two separate issues: Incorrect speeds, and incorrect thrust.

On takeoff, a tailstrike can happen for a number of reasons, but the most relavent in this case is the aircraft is just not going fast enough to lift off, the pilot continues to pull back, and the tail scrapes along the ground.

The question that we next ask is why was the aircraft not going fast enough. In some cases, it is just that the crew have incorrectly calculated the rotation speed. When this occurs, you'll see the tailstrike happen at the normal rotation point, say 2/3rds the way down the runway.

In other cases, it is that the aircraft is rapidly approaching the end of the runway, and it just doesn't have the required speed. The pilot has to rotate to try and get it off the ground before the runway disappears, and it is just a little too slow to fly, and so strikes the ground. This is what has happened in this case.

The causes are similar, but distinct - In the first case, it is simply a caclulation error of the takeoff speeds, but correct thrust/weight. In the second (and likely in the Emirates situation), the aircraft was significantly heavier than the performance data used, and so the speeds may or may not have been correct, but the thrust was wrong for the weight.

The reason that this second one becomes an issue is because of derated takeoffs. We reduce the engine thrust on every takeoff, to be the minimum required (plus some good buffers), in order to reduce engine wear. It is a very well established practice on all aircraft types, and certainly not something new.

Here is the catch. If the aircraft take off thrust was based on being 100t lighter than what it was, obviously there is just not going to be enough thrust to get you to the required speed on the runway available at the heavier weight, which is what looks like might have happened here (although we don't know for sure).

So, thrust lower than what is required to accelerate the aircraft to its takeoff speed on the runway means rotating at a slower speed than the aircraft can technincally perform at, resulting in tailstrike.

As to depressurised flight, well, good luck to them.

[NickN]

I'd hate to see the fuel bill for a low altitude depressurized ferry from Australia to France!

I'm surprised the pilots didn't detect that they weren't approaching Vr speed in the required time and perform a RTO. Would a pilot know their aircraft wasn't accelerating appropriately and know something was wrong? After using up two thirds of YMML's runway and still not being anywhere near the required speed would ring alarm bells for a pilot wouldn't it?

[Owen H]

Its a tough one! He would notice at some point, but by the time he does it might be too late to do anything other than continue anyway.

Values like V1 have no meaning when they are calculated for the incorrect weight/thrust.

[Mike W]

Maybe they should just "junk it". (I'm joking in case anyone takes exception)

I'm sure EK would prefer to take the insurance on a 345 and move on. (Not joking) :p

[NickN]

I understand that after V1 the only decision is to go, but what happens in an instance like this when there isn't enough thrust to get off the ground in time?

Also, even though the FMC selected the incorrect thrust due to incorrect weight input, can the pilot apply any more thrust manually by pushing the thrust levers further forward? Or is full thrust (i.e. levers fully forward) the de-rated selection as made by the FMC?

I hope that made sense !

[Andrew McLaughlin]

I understand that after V1 the only decision is to go, but what happens in an instance like this when there isn't enough thrust to get off the ground in time?

What happens is what happened in Melbourne....or much worse!

Also, even though the FMC selected the incorrect thrust due to incorrect weight input, can the pilot apply any more thrust manually by pushing the thrust levers further forward? Or is full thrust (i.e. levers fully forward) the de-rated selection as made by the FMC?

The pilots can override by hitting the TOGA switch.

[NickN]

Would they not have had the sense to take advantage of the TOGA switch when their backside was scraping the paint at the end of the runway?

Given the fact they only just cleared a 2.7m fence half a kilometre from the end of the runway it appears as if no further action was taken. I would have been hittin' that switch like a madman to get off the ground quickly!

[Owen H]

Theoretically a pilot would hit the switch and push the thrust levers fully forward to get maximum thrust.

That said, there are enough similar incidents that have shown the pilots are too busy just trying to keep the aircraft upright than to think of hitting TOGA.

[NickN]

Thats true Owen, I suppose so much is happening during takeoff that sometimes the most simple things get overlooked.

Out of curiosity, what procedures are in place for checking and then re-checking the weights and inputs into the FMC to avoid incidents where incorrect weights affect thrust settings? I would have assumed there was a system for checking everything before actually flying.

[Chris Griffiths]

Would they not have had the sense to take advantage of the TOGA switch when their backside was scraping the paint at the end of the runway?

Given the fact they only just cleared a 2.7m fence half a kilometre from the end of the runway it appears as if no further action was taken. I would have been hittin' that switch like a madman to get off the ground quickly!

It is only a TOGA button, not a miracle anti gravity device, you cannot instantly transform a couple of hundred tons of lumbering truck into a rocket ship. You need to be aware enough of your situation to press it and take other action soon enough, it appears for whatever reason this crew were not in that position.

[Ken K]

I'm surprised the pilots didn't detect that they weren't approaching Vr speed in the required time and perform a RTO. Would a pilot know their aircraft wasn't accelerating appropriately and know something was wrong? After using up two thirds of YMML's runway and still not being anywhere near the required speed would ring alarm bells for a pilot wouldn't it?
What Owen said about V1 going out of the window when calculated for incorrect thrust is correct. Taking an inadequate thrust example, as V1 would occur at a point further down the runway, you can neither guarantee there is enough runway to stop in the runway remaining in a stop scenario from V1, nor that continuing from V1 with engine out will result in attaining a height of 35ft by the end of the runway.

Bear in mind too that in the high-speed portion of the takeoff (above 100kt for the A330/340), a pilot should be go-minded. While I can't comment on Emirates policy for rejected takeoffs on their A330/340, here's another carrier's policy for the A330:

Between 100kt and V1, reject only for:
ENGINE FIRE
APU FIRE
ENG FAIL
ENG OIL LO PRES
ENG REV UNLOCKED (reverser unlocked)
CONFIG Warning
SIDESTICK FAULT
L+R ELV FAULT (elevator fault)
Severe damage
Tyre failure below v1-20kt

Continue if visibility lost

Andrew, the Airbuses don't actually have a TOGA switch. A derate is deleted by moving the throttle levers from the FLX/MCT detent (takeoff setting when using a derate) to the TOGA position. Pushing TO/GA to remove a derate doesn't work on the B744 either. It can only be used to remove a derate after lift-off and before the reference thrust limit changes to climb.

[NickN]

So in theory...... the EK pilot could have simply pushed the thrust lever forward to TOGA and this incident may have been somewhat avoidable or less severe?

Does anybody have any de-rate calculation charts for the 737-800 and the 767-300ER?

I understand charts can be runway/airport specific but if a basic version exists I'd love to get hold of one.

Someone on the old board posted up a chart for the 747-400 RR version but I am more interested in the others.

[Andrew McLaughlin]

Andrew, the Airbuses don't actually have a TOGA switch. A derate is deleted by moving the throttle levers from the FLX/MCT detent (takeoff setting when using a derate) to the TOGA position. Pushing TO/GA to remove a derate doesn't work on the B744 either. It can only be used to remove a derate after lift-off and before the reference thrust limit changes to climb.

Yep, sorry. I meant a metaphoric 'TOGA button' where you would employ the TOGA procedure!

[Philip Argy]

I understand derating is standard procedure and that everyone does it to save engine wear, but as was discovered after the QF1 incident in Bangkok, sometimes wear-saving procedures leave less safety margin than is desirable.

I'd be interested to know whether it would really be a significant issue if everyone increased thrust by, say 10%, from the current de-rate tables. I assume the result would be earlier rotation and a stronger climb out performance, which to me as a pax equals a better safety margin.

I've been on some trans-Pacific takeoffs on a fully laden UA B744 and they often seem to be really lumbering on climb out, especially SYD-bound out of SFO and LAX.

[Owen H]

G'day Philip,

The thing about the derate is that when you are heavy weight, the aircraft will then perform the same. That means, for the takeoffs from SFO/LAX to AUS, there is probably no derate applied if it looks like it is "lumbering".

I know the 744 from LAX to SYD usually cannot derate its takeoff as it is performance limited anyway.

The problem with adding say 10% to the derate tables is that there has already been a significant buffer applied. The aircraft when it is at max weight is limited, but still has large buffers. When we derate we have those buffers plus the additional ones for the derate.

How much is enough? Derated takeoffs do not really cause problems, as they are designed to meet all the criteria, plus the buffer, in the worst case scenario of an engine failure at V1. The additional thrust is always available to the pilot if he chooses to take it during the takeoff roll or after becoming airborn.

An additional 10% doesn't help the situation here, as they still wouldn't have had enough thrust.

On the subject of TOGA... its a bit of a misnoma anyway.. the TOGA button on the 767 doens't TO, it just GA's. LOL

[Andrew M]

My understanding was a preliminary review from the ATSB comes out within 30 days.

30 days have passed

[NickN]

This might be time to ask this question I know its a little off course but still relevant.

On the 767-300ER when does the change between TOGA and CLB thrust occur? Is there a set speed, flap position or altitude determine this?

And is CRZ activated only when the aircraft reaches cruise altitute, or is there an altitude where cruise climb is used and CRZ is activated at that point?

And another question (sorry but I am curious about these things).... say TOGA thrust is 105% N1, in general the engines will go right to 105% N1 for take-off. However, in CLB mode thrust is limited to 102% N1 for example but the aircraft may only go to 98% N1 to sustain the profile as determined by the auto pilot. Would an airline actually use the entire max allowed CLB thrust of 102% N1 to climb as high and fast as possible even if that climb was over say 3000fpm? Or would they take the conservative approach and just use the 98% N1 required for say a 2500fpm climb?

I understand using more power means more fuel burn on climbout, but in general that means reaching cruise altitude quicker and therefore starting a fuel conservative cruise profile quicker. Or is it more economical to climb slow and save fuel on the way up even if that slower climb means higher fuel burn over a longer time than the first option?

I have always wondered what the practice is in these situations.

.... and gee I hope I made sense with those questions.

[Owen H]

Hi Nick,

The 767 is a bit of a special case, using a fairly "unique" thrust management computer, so these answers do only apply to the 767, as the others are a little different. You have picked the difficult aircraft!

Change from TO to CLB thrust occurs when VNAV or FLCH is selected, or CLB is selected on the thrust management panel. The height that thrust is reduced is dependant on the noise abatement profile that the airport requires (typically 1000ft).

However, in CLB mode thrust is limited to 102% N1 for example but the aircraft may only go to 98% N1 to sustain the profile as determined by the auto pilot.

This isn't exactly how it works. The aircraft will climb in VNAV SPD, meaning that speed control is on the elevator. The FMC does not have a set climb profile as such, the thrust is set to the climb limit selected, and then the aircraft climbs at whatever rate results from that.

When it levels off, it goes into VNAV PTH. The elevators are now on maintaining the altitude, while the thrust is adjusted to maintain speed. So the allowable limit remains CLB, however the thrust is modified to maintain the speed.

There are two practical climb thrusts available.. Full Rating, and Rating 1. Full Rating sets the climb limit at its highest, and rating one sets the climb limit at a reduced amount.

And for the final question (I'm running out of breath!) it is more fuel economical to climb at full climb thrust compared to a reduced climb thrust, however the reduction in engine wear by using reduced thrust more than offsets the fuel usage, and so "rating 1" reduced climb thurst is used on the majority of "lighter weight" climbs.

Hope that answers some of them!

[Philip Argy]

[-snip-]
... it is more fuel economical to climb at full climb thrust compared to a reduced climb thrust, however the reduction in engine wear by using reduced thrust more than offsets the fuel usage ...


Are there optimisation algorithms that go into the FMCs or is it a matter of company policy/crew instructions/PIC discretion?

[NickN]

Ok I think I understand Owen, basically in the climbout phase the elevators control the speed (by determining angle of attack/pitch up) not the engines (the engines just produce a constant amount of thrust), and the aircraft climbs at whatever rate is determined by those two factors combined with whatever speed setting is set as maximum.

When in a cruise profile the elevators then manage altitude and the engines then power up or down to control speed.

So basically the FLCH is never used to climb to cruise altitude, it is only used for inflight altitude changes from one cruise altitude to another?

I think from memory the thurst management panel has TOGA, CLB, 1, 2, CRZ, CON (havent got the panel right in front of me operating from memory). Does 1 represent the climb thrusts you mentioned, i.e. CLB is full rating and 1 is thrust rating 1?

The 767 is my favourite aircraft I love learning how it functions!

[Chris Roope]

So basically the FLCH is never used to climb to cruise altitude, it is only used for inflight altitude changes from one cruise altitude to another?

I think from memory the thurst management panel has TOGA, CLB, 1, 2, CRZ, CON (havent got the panel right in front of me operating from memory). Does 1 represent the climb thrusts you mentioned, i.e. CLB is full rating and 1 is thrust rating 1?


FLCH could be used in the same way as VNAV for a climb, in that the aircraft will pitch to maintain the speed set on the MCP, and thrust will advance to whatever reference thrust is selected on the TMSP (which would be CLB or CLB1 during a climb). The aircraft would then climb at whatever rate of climb that speed and thrust resulted in. The standard procedure for climb however is to use VNAV.

Correct CLB is full rating climb thrust, CLB1 is full rating minus 10% and CLB2 is full rating minus 20%.

[NickN]

Chris thank you!

This has always been one of those things I have wanted to understand. Many thanks to yourself and Owen.

[Owen H]

Philip, the second. Company policy augmented by Captain's discretion for operational reasons.

P.S Nick, the TSMP is by far and away the most difficult piece of equimpent installed on a 767! It looks easy, but takes a while to get your head fully around it. You are correct that the 1 represents CLB 1, and the CLB is full rating climb. The order of actually pressing them is an entirely other matter, and can't really be explained simply.

[NickN]

That's ok Owen you have done brilliantly explaining things already! Thank you.

[Radi K]

anyone got a pic?

[Kieran Wells]

From http://www.news.com.au/travel/story/0,28318,25387505-5014090,00.html


THE pilot of the Emirates flight that nearly crashed at Melbourne Airport with 225 passengers on board had almost no sleep the previous day and was following the airline's orders to take off at reduced power to save money on fuel.

Several sources told the Sunday Herald Sun that Emirates - like many modern airlines - ordered its pilots to take off at reduced thrust when possible to cut fuel costs, emissions and wear on the aircraft.

The thrust or power settings are determined by factors such as aircraft weight, weather conditions, the surrounding terrain and runway length.

But an Emirates source said the March 20 flight - EK407 to Dubai - was set at the "absolute minimum" thrust, leaving little room for error.

"There was no margin for error," the source said.

"This is all about the money."

Emirates yesterday issued a statement saying safety was a top priority for the airline.

"Safety is at the forefront of all operations within the Emirates group," a spokeswoman said.

Sources said a report due on Thursday was expected to show the near-catastrophic accident happened after the incorrect weight was typed into the plane's computers, causing it to set an inadequate take-off speed.

Air safety investigators are examining Emirates' staff records, including the work rosters of some of its pilots, to see if there are systemic safety problems within the airline that could have contributed to the near disaster.

The Sunday Herald Sun learned that the pilot of the plane was also almost at the threshold of the number of hours he was legally able to fly.

Emirates pilots are permitted to fly a maximum 100 hours each 28 days.

Investigators are examining whether pilot fatigue was a factor after being told the pilot had barely slept the day before the flight.

Several sources confirmed that Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators were also looking at whether any other "human factors" needed to be addressed.

The inspection of Emirates' records is part of the bureau's investigation - expected to take up to a year - into the reasons behind the error.

The inquiry will investigate issues such as cockpit distractions and crew resource management.

A source said it was not possible for one person alone to commit the error.

"It happens because a range of things come together at the right time," the source said.

An Emirates source said the airline was in a risky situation because it did not have a culture that encouraged people to voice their safety concerns.

The source said some Emirates pilots were badly fatigued, but people were afraid to speak out.

"There is a limit to how far you can push people," the source said. "Those long-haul flights are really, really fatiguing and demanding.

"But a punitive culture means people are too afraid to speak out.

"Two things, (flight safety and the punitive culture) in my view, that do not match in 2009 and in a major airline.

"A very bad cocktail."

It can also be revealed that:

THE tail crashed into the runway with such force that passengers heard a loud scraping noise and some saw a heavy shower of sparks.

THE impact ripped a hole in the fuselage, causing what appeared to be smoke and dust to swirl into the cabin.

THE pilot made three announcements during the next 35 minutes as he circled Port Phillip Bay to dump fuel before returning to land.

NONE of the announcements told passengers how serious the situation was and the passengers were not in the "brace position" when the plane landed.

THE weight error was made before the plane left the departure gate.

PASSENGERS, including Anita and Ray Chappel, escaped uninjured after the plane landed safely.

The two pilots involved in the accident were forced to resign 48 hours after they were flown back to Dubai.

Safety Bureau and Civil Aviation Safety Authority officials are thought to be concerned about the action taken against the pilots, but have no jurisdiction to intervene.

Emirates pilots, using false names, have flooded the internet to express their concern about rostering, fatigue and the action taken against the two pilots.

The men are expatriates and at least one has since returned to his home country.

The United Arab Emirates does not allow unions, so more than 2000 Emirates pilots employed worldwide are not covered by a union.

Investigations by the Sunday Herald Sun further revealed the pilot was no stranger to the runways at Tullamarine, flying into Melbourne for almost five years, about once every two months.

The pilots - two operating pilots and two augmenting pilots - and 14 crew members returned to their hotel in Melbourne immediately after the accident.

The next day, bureau investigators came to the hotel to conduct interviews.

The man leading the inquiry is investigator Paul Ballard.

Emirates is sending some of its senior managers to Australia to handle the fall-out from Thursday's release of the preliminary report.

Andrew Parker, an Australian now based in Dubai as Emirates' senior vice-president of public, government and environmental affairs, will arrive in Australia this week with Capt Alan Stealey, Emirates' divisional senior vice-president of flight operations.

Emirates declined to comment on the March 20 accident because of the bureau's investigation.

But the company said it had continuously reached international safety standards and had been a founding member of the Gulf Flight Safety Committee - a Middle East aviation body.

The company denied it had a punitive culture that discouraged open discussion about safety concerns.

"Emirates has a positive and open safety reporting culture that helps management understand safety issues before they become significant concerns," a spokeswoman said.

The company would not answer direct questions about reduced-thrust take-offs, the fate of the pilots and the future of the damaged aircraft.

[D Chan]

From http://www.news.com.au/travel/story/0,28318,25387505-5014090,00.html

As a person who works in the industry I have seen some of the reporting by the Telegraph and I'd dare say their reporting in airline safety have not been always factually correct. I would urge anyone who read the article take it with a grain of salt and don't base it as solid hard facts.

There could be a whole host of reasons why the crew barely slept in the previous day (if this was factually correct). It could be do with jet lag (circadian rhythm), pattern, hours, their activities in Melbourne during the layover, the hotel accomodation etc.

The punitive culture aspect is scary because if there were systemic issues in EK involved and the crew were treated as such for an honest mistake, who in future would dare to report/raise the issues with their seniors in EK?

[NickN]

Personally I haven't heard any other incidents involving EK in a long time. No to say their hasn't been any but I never hear them. If there is a systemic problem they must cover it up well.

[Matt_L]

As a person who works in the industry I have seen some of the reporting by the Telegraph and I'd dare say their reporting in airline safety have not been always factually correct. I would urge anyone who read the article take it with a grain of salt and don't base it as solid hard facts.

There could be a whole host of reasons why the crew barely slept in the previous day (if this was factually correct). It could be do with jet lag (circadian rhythm), pattern, hours, their activities in Melbourne during the layover, the hotel accomodation etc.

The punitive culture aspect is scary because if there were systemic issues in EK involved and the crew were treated as such for an honest mistake, who in future would dare to report/raise the issues with their seniors in EK?

This is very true- The issue of fatigue has been evidenced before in Qantas and many airlines on long haul flying and is not an isolated problem with Emirates. Some would remember the Korean Air 743 crash in Guam on approach in 1997- the Captain was severly fatigued and this was a contributing factor.

You would just hope in Melbourne on Thursday the ATSB and whoever else from the regulatory bodies (CASA etc) that is there will present the truth and whole facts to the media and in the report released to the public.

It will no doubt be an interesting read and if there are recommendations made by the report hopefully some pressure will be put on EK to make these changes albeit it massive ones if it is in the culture as the news limited report says.

Also- I think the fact that Emirates is sending those senior execs is almost a pre emptive action ( if what the article says is true) and they are clearly worried by the implications of this report being released and they have very good reason too even with what we know so far

[Jason H]

There was a similar article in the Herald yesterday, and it mentioned that the pilots were forced to resign when they got back to Dubai. Must have been significant pilot error involved.

http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travel-news/pilot-barely-slept-day-before-emirates-neardisaster-20090427-ajtb.html

[Chris Griffiths]

Must have been significant pilot error involved.


Or a serious culture of denial within the management of Emirates.
Is there a systemic procedures issue at EK?
How many other airlines have had 3 serious tail strike incidents in only a few years?

[Montague S]

Sounds like something from a thread on a certain foreign carrier in another section of this site... ;)

[NickN]

At least EK's tail strikes haven't killed anyone yet. The "other" foreign carrier you refer to seems to have the uncanny ability (read predisposition) of killing people in their accidents.

[Philip Argy]

Confirmation of what others have anticipated:


ATSB Preliminary Factual Report: A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport, 20 March 2009

28 April 2009


A media conference to release the Preliminary Factual Report on the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport on 20 March 2009, will be held on: Thursday 30 April 2009

Where: ATSB offices, Level 2, 62 Northbourne Avenue, CANBERRA
Time: 10:30 am (local time)

Mr Julian Walsh, Director of Aviation Safety Investigation will discuss factual information known to the investigation team at this time and will outline the investigation process.

[Martin Buzzell]

Confirmation of what others have anticipated:

Probably say that they entered the wrong "Flex" setting. The media reported that the pilots resigned, I heard they were sacked.

[John R]

The media reported that the pilots resigned, I heard they were sacked.

In business it's much easier and cleaner if you suggest to someone they resign or......

Looks much better on their c/v or references down the track also.

[D Chan]

Personally I haven't heard any other incidents involving EK in a long time

It has been 3 years or so but the similarity is scary - takeoff, overrun, wheels hit approach lights

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2006/01/11/203980/emirates-censured-in-airbus-a340-johannesburg-runway-overrun.html

[Philip Argy]

It will be even more scary if it turns out to have been caused by a sidestick over rotation command the same as in Johannesburg. :eek:

[Greg McDonald]

Another article:

AIR accident investigators probing the near-disastrous Emirates tail-strike incident at Melbourne Airport are concerned that wrong load numbers were punched into the jet's flight computer.
The Herald Sun has been told the take-off load could have been up to 100 tonnes more than the weight recorded.

The ATSB will release its report tomorrow on the March 20 incident at Tullamarine, which it has already billed as “significant”.

The report, which details everything that happened that night, is said to include graphic pictures taken by airport security cameras.

Other photos show damage to the runway as well as burns in surrounding grass caused by the plane's four jet engines.

Two senior Emirates executives have flown to Melbourne from the airline's Dubai headquarters to carry out media briefings.

Sources told the Herald Sun yesterday that the situation may have arisen because too many people were on the flight deck before the aircraft pulled back from the terminal.

Apart from the four pilots usually in Emirates cockpits on long-haul flights, between two and four other people could have been present in the pre-flight check period.
”There is a great deal of conjecture about, that wrong load numbers were punched into the FMC (Flight Management Computer),” International Air Pilots' Association spokesman Barry Jackson said last night.

Pilots are handed a load chart for each flight before takeoff. It includes fuel levels, cargo and passenger loadings.

Emirates Flight EK407, with 225 passengers, was racing down runway 16 at 280km/h when the pilot and first officer realised almost too late they had insufficient power to lift the big jet into the air.

Their last-minute action saved the passengers.

Emirates refused to confirm if it had demoted its vice-president of airline safety.

[Andrew M]

Will be very interesting reading and hopefully a few lessons learnt when the report comes out tomorrow.

What I was unaware of is that the plane can be configured very easily into a mode that will not allow it to takeoff by the end of the runway.

That surprises me!

[Philip Argy]

Not sure it's usual for the media to have so much detail in advance of the official release of an ATSB preliminary report. Someone with an advance copy may have leaked it inappropriately. :(

[Mike W]

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/28/325745/emirates-yet-to-decide-whether-to-repair-damaged-a340-500.html

As I've said before, do they really want this bird now?

[NickN]

And thats just the fuselage damage, the landing gear also copped a beating as well didn't it? Being only 5 years old they may try and salvage it.

[Matt_L]

Wasnt it mentioned here or somewhere else that Emirates/Airbus will get it into a state where it can fly unpressurized back to Toulouse for further evaluation.

I'm 100% sure I saw something on this, maybe on avherald.com.

[Andrew M]

Not sure it's usual for the media to have so much detail in advance of the official release of an ATSB preliminary report. Someone with an advance copy may have leaked it inappropriately. :(

Details are not always facts!

All that information in that link posted a few posts back, had information that has been all over airwhiners.net and pprunewhiners.org, so nothing new there.

The media have a habbit of quoting "sources" which are in fact nothing more than an internet forum. I have a friend who is having a "discussion" with a major media outlet over a supposed quote, that went to press, that he never said to anyone.

[Philip Argy]

Wasnt it mentioned here or somewhere else that Emirates/Airbus will get it into a state where it can fly unpressurized back to Toulouse for further evaluation.

I'm 100% sure I saw something on this, maybe on avherald.com.

See post #39 this thread: http://yssyforum.net/board/showpost.php?p=26719&postcount=39

[Philip Argy]

Here is the link to the ATSB Preliminary Report just released: http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/AAIR/aair200901310.aspx (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/AAIR/aair200901310.aspx)

[Matt_L]

ATSB interim report released.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2009/AAIR/pdf/AO2009012_Prelim.pdf

Main things that have come out of this for those who dont wish to read whole report:

1.) selection of Manual Control Thrust (MCT) instead of Takeoff Go Around TO/GA for takeoff (thus a de-rated thrust takeoff).
2.) Input into laptop of 100 tonne lower than actual takeoff weight resulting in different V Reference speeds and thrust settings not applicable to the A340-500.

Nothing is mentioned of crews state before the flight (fatigue as news limited article suggested). All that is shown is the hours and currency of the Captain and F/O who both had approx 8100 and 8300 hours total respectively.

[Philip Argy]

The report seems to have missing text from the middle of page 15 through to the end of page 16 - does anyone have a version where that text is readable?

The remarkable thing from the material that is readable is how far past the end of the runway the a/c went before achieving climb (292 metres!). For the landing gear to take out a Localiser Array antenna the a/c must have been just a few metres from ploughing through it with much more serious consequences.

And it is extraordinary that the Flight Data Recorder stopped because the tail strike was severe enough to dislodge it from its rack - there is thus no FDR information after the tail strike. I'd have thought Airbus will need to beef up the mounting of the FDR rack after this as a tail strike is not exactly unheard of and it should not be enough to render the FDR useless.

[Malcolm Parker]

just reading it now and judging by the pictures with damage to ground equipment, i am only realising how close that incident became a disaster. The most startling picture was how close to the end of the runway the aircraft struck the runway with wheels losing contact with the ground 115metres past the stopway and not establishing PR/C some 292 metres after the end of the runway.

[Matt_L]

Please refrain from quoting the whole post above in your post, it is not necessary - mod

Absolutely!

its been widely reported that the main bogeys missed the fence by 50cm, I didnt see this in report but maybe to come in next one.

just take a look at google maps of Melbourne Tullamarine and see how close the 345 came to hitting the fence number one and number two the operations road which is presumably a fairly busy stretch right around airport perimeter.

As you say very close to disaster and being catastrophic.

I think the biggest question ive gotta ask is- if crew flying Airbus aircraft all around the world are trained to perform takeoffs at TO/GA why was MCT selection accepted by the crew on this flight, especially on one of such length with a decent load of passengers?

Someone correct me if im wrong on this- but I wouldnt of thought you would be de-rating a takeoff on a 13-14 hour flight even with the length of runway 16/34?

[Philip Argy]

This may be a dumb question but can't the weight of an aircraft be approximated by the degree of compression of the landing gear? Even my 4wd has auto height adjustment according to the load sensed.

And the laptops used for the pre-flight calculations (and the FMC for that matter) should surely have an "Are you sure?" prompt when an input weight value is so far outside what a normally laden a/c would be expected to be.

The panic because of the 'smoke' (which seems to have been reported late to the flight deck) seems also to have caused the overweight (280 tonnes) landing - presumably the fuel dump was aborted before the weight of the a/c had been reduced to maximum landing weight (243 tonnes).

This preliminary report seems to lack a lot of the basic information that one normally sees in them. I wonder if there has been a problem with getting answers from the air crew (combined with the loss of FDR).

[NickN]

I think the biggest question ive gotta ask is- if crew flying Airbus aircraft all around the world are trained to perform takeoffs at TO/GA why was MCT selection accepted by the crew on this flight

Because that is the EK policy for maximum fuel conservation. And why thrash an engine using TOGA when the de-rated MCT take-off is sufficient? MCT would have been fine in this instance had the correct data been input into the FMC.

A question for the pilots on the board...... What is the procedure (if any) for re-checking the FMC data prior to a flight? Is it input by one crew member then checked by another? And does Airbus and Boeing determine what procedure is used or is that dependant on the specific airline?

[Martin Buzzell]

Some nice pictures, haven't seen those. The report itself doesn't say much more than we already know. It still sends shivers though me how close they were. Lucky it was the end of summer and the ground was hard.

[Matt_L]

Because that is the EK policy for maximum fuel conservation. And why thrash an engine using TOGA when the de-rated MCT take-off is sufficient? MCT would have been fine in this instance had the correct data been input into the FMC.

A question for the pilots on the board...... What is the procedure (if any) for re-checking the FMC data prior to a flight? Is it input by one crew member then checked by another? And does Airbus and Boeing determine what procedure is used or is that dependant on the specific airline?

The FMC's are not independant of each other in the fact that if the f/o inputs the data- it will appear on the captains fmc screens. However one pilot can be on progress screen whilst one is on the takeoff initiate page for example. So in saying this id assume a double check is in the order before takeoff.

Boeing and Airbus set out standard operating procedures which are then tailored towards an airline , in documents known as FCOM- Flight Crew Operating Manual. They are slightly different procedurally for each airline.

[Erik H. Bakke]

Wouldn't it be possible to have the aircraft computers calculate these things based on the actual weight of the aircraft?

There is a relationship between the aircraft weight and the pressure on the undercarriage, so if the pressure can be measured, the computer should be able to calculate a suggested thrust which can then increased by the pilot if necessary.

[Andrew M]

As mentioned above, the report seems to be very light on data, and the same stuff is repeated word for word many times.

Not much new information aside from the pics

VERY lucky that the bird actually got off the ground

[Ken K]

Matt, a quick correction. During takeoff, if the thrust lever is in FLX/MCT detent:

If a flex takeoff temp is entered which is higher than the current TAT, then the engine will run in the flex takeoff thrust setting (FLX).
Otherwise, the thrust commanded will be Maximum Continuous Thrust (MCT).


Because that is the EK policy for maximum fuel conservation.
Not true. Flexible thrust is used to reduce engine wear. Using flexible thrust on takeoff increases fuel burn as engines are less efficient when not at full thrust, and also because it takes longer to reach the cruise level.

A question for the pilots on the board...... What is the procedure (if any) for re-checking the FMC data prior to a flight? Is it input by one crew member then checked by another? And does Airbus and Boeing determine what procedure is used or is that dependant on the specific airline?
The actual procedure is airline-specific. The Airbus FCOM doesn't actually focus on "data insertion and verification" procedures in its SOP section, more about what should be completed (by the crew as a whole) when. While I can't speak for Emirates, here's another example from another airline. FO enters MCDU data as preliminary preflight procedure, then data crosschecked by both pilots. After receiving the final loadsheet, both pilots review ZFW and enter/review Takeoff Data.

And the laptops used for the pre-flight calculations (and the FMC for that matter) should surely have an "Are you sure?" prompt when an input weight value is so far outside what a normally laden a/c would be expected to be.
The Takeoff Performance calculator does not look at departure/arrival airport combination, or sector length. Inputs are Airport/Runway, wind, OAT (Outside Air Temperature), QNH (Air Pressure), TOW (Takeoff Weight), Conf (Flaps Setting), Air Conditioning (Packs setting), Anti-Ice, Runway (Surface) Condition and any MEL's. As long as the input values are within a certain predefined range, the software will accept them. The FMGS too will accept pretty much any value. As the saying goes, Garbage In, Garbage Out.

The report seems to have missing text from the middle of page 15 through to the end of page 16 - does anyone have a version where that text is readable?
There is a footnote at the base of Page 15, so it's likely to be intact. Page 16 appears to be blank.

This may be a dumb question but can't the weight of an aircraft be approximated by the degree of compression of the landing gear? Even my 4wd has auto height adjustment according to the load sensed.
That's an option for the A330 and A340 called the Weight and Balance System. It measures Gross Weight and Centre of Gravity, and works through sensors on the landing gears. I believe the system does have limits though, for example requires a totally flat base to attain an accurate reading, as well wind and other operating limitations.

[Andrew M]

That's an option for the A330 and A340 called the Weight and Balance System. It measures Gross Weight and Centre of Gravity, and works through sensors on the landing gears. I believe the system does have limits though, for example requires a totally flat base to attain an accurate reading, as well wind and other operating limitations.

Interesting, I am sure it would pick up a 100ton difference in keyed weight vs real weight.

Surprised it is an option, we are not talking about mood lighting here.

[Owen H]

Various airlines and aircraft have trialed these "weight on gear" weight and balance systems, and none of them have ever been widely accepted. So far they have been too unreliable and inaccurate to be of widespread use.

Sure, they might provide a double check that you aren't 100t out, but realistically you shouldn't be that far out anyway. This serves as a very good reminder that pilots need to check both weight and thrust setting for "reasonableness" prior to takeoff. The aircraft cannot really do this, because it is designed to be operated through a wide range of weights, and so as far as the computer is concerned, it was a valid weight.

I will be interested to see if Airbus, and Emirates, have mandated the use of one figure (ZFW or TOW) throughout both the FMC AND the EFB, or they mix the two.

Interestingly enough, Boeing recommend that crew only ever enter ZFW, and were for a while discussing the option of deactivating the TOW entry so that mishaps like the SQ 777 couldn't happen, although I'm not sure how far that ever got.

[Ken K]

Yep it's two figures used however each one of those systems only accepts one. The LPC application is based on TOW, while the MCDU accepts only ZFW.

[Carsten Bauer]

Hi all,

Does anybody know who the report is, who asks the question at 10:49 into the media conference.

"Given the damage to the aircraft, was there any way that this flight could have made it to it's destination safely"
"I dont think continuing to the destination would have been an option for the crew..." Interrupted by report
"I know, but what I'm trying to clarify is, could it have made it, if there was no warning"

What a total **** head???
If you check out the QF71 media conferences, he makes several stupid comments and questions in those conferences as well.


Other than that, why isn't the fuel load shown anywhere in the report?
What sort of burn rate does the A345 have, and how long is the flight from MEL to DXB?

Cheers,

Carsten

PS. Does anybody have a list of the ULD's on board this flight? I'm missing some entries in my logbook!

[Andrew McLaughlin]

Does anybody know who the report is, who asks the question at 10:49 into the media conference.

"Given the damage to the aircraft, was there any way that this flight could have made it to it's destination safely"
"I dont think continuing to the destination would have been an option for the crew..." Interrupted by report
"I know, but what I'm trying to clarify is, could it have made it, if there was no warning"

What a total **** head???
If you check out the QF71 media conferences, he makes several stupid comments and questions in those conferences as well.

If you don't know who the report(er?) is, how do you know it's the same one who "made several stupid comments and questions" in the QF71 media conferences? It's probably a reasonable question for a lay media person to ask. I have much greater issues with his questions late in the media conference about wheter QLD is the most dangerous place to fly in Australia!?!?!?

What annoyed me was the ATSB guy's reluctance to state that, due to the apparent damage to the pressure bulkhead and the full thickness damage to the aircraft's skin, it is unlikely the aircraft would have pressurised and thus, it would not have been possible to proceed to Dubai!

[chrisb]

"I know, but what I'm trying to clarify is, could it have made it, if there was no warning"

What a total **** head???


Why is that silly? What's he's probably pressing for is the fact that there was rear bulkhead damage and he wanted a good quote regarding the potential disaster if they'd tried pressurizing it.

[NickN]

Sometimes playing dumb gets you the answers you want and who better to feign stupidity than a reporter looking for a break.

[Robert Zweck]

He could be the same guy who thinks that jets land on the "tarmac "

[Andrew McLaughlin]

Sometimes playing dumb gets you the answers you want and who better to feign stupidity than a reporter looking for a break.

:rolleyes: *sigh*

That's funny, because I've always found if you ask a stupid question, you'll often get a stupid answer (dare I say, like half the questions on these forums sometimes...), whereas if you go to the effort of doing a bit of research before hand and can at least display a bit of knowledge on the subject, you're more likely to get a more detailed answer.

He could be the same guy who thinks that jets land on the "tarmac "

But jets DO land on the "tarmac", Robert. Tarmac is short for 'tarmacadam' which is a type of paved surface commonly used on roads, runways, ramps and taxiways.

[Nigel C]

A further report in the media today...

From http://www.news.com.au/travel/story/0,28318,25421565-5014090,00.html

Emirates pilots say another crash is 'highly probable'
By James Campbell and Ellen Whinnett
Herald Sun
May 03, 2009 08:20am

Warning ... Emirates pilots fear fatigue could lead to a crash.
Emirates pilots complain about fatigue
Say passenger safety is under threat
Blame safety problems on morale, management

THREE Emirates pilots have spoken out about fatigue problems at the airline, saying passenger safety is under threat.

The pilots, who all currently fly for the airline, spoke separately to the Sunday Herald Sun to outline concerns about fatigue, morale and management of the United Arab Emirates-based airline.

"I don't want to see a smoking hole in the ground with an Emirates tail on it, but the way we're going that's highly probable," one pilot said.

The men's concerns came after the Australian Transport Safety Bureau made a preliminary finding that fatigue did not appear to be a factor in the accident of an Emirates jet at Melbourne Airport on March 20.

The comments by the ATSB came even though the pilot had barely slept in the day before the accident and had flown 98.9 hours in the previous month.

He was allowed to fly a maximum of 100 hours.

One pilot insisted fatigue was a major problem for ultra-long-haul pilots, who were averaging 90 hours of flying time every 28 days and often reaching their maximum allowable limit.

The pilots who spoke to the Sunday Herald Sun asked for their names to be withheld, fearing repercussions from the airline.

Australian and International Pilots Association president Barry Jackson said Qantas ultra-long-haul pilots flew significantly fewer hours than their Emirates colleagues.

While they had a limit of 100 flying hours in 30 days, compared with Emirates' 100 hours in 28 days, they usually averaged 60-70 hours.

Mr Jackson, a serving Qantas pilot, said Emirates' long-haul flying policy was "a lot tougher on their pilots".

"They would be working a lot harder than us," Mr Jackson said.

One of the Emirates pilots urged the ATSB to examine the crew records of the pilot and first officer in charge of EK407, the flight that almost crashed at Melbourne Airport after the wrong numbers were entered into the plane's computer.

He said all pilots were being worked incredibly hard as Emirates struggled through the global economic crisis.

"If there is going to be a fatigue-related accident, it is probably going to be Emirates," he said.

Emirates has grounded four other pilots as a result of near-fatal blunders in the past month.

In Ghana, an Emirates crew typed the wrong take-off calculations into their aircraft when they took off from Kotoka International Airport in Accra.

The problem was discovered because the plane took off too low and a noise complaint was lodged when the plane flew over the presidential palace, a no-go zone.

In England, an Emirates flight lined up to land on the wrong runway at Manchester.

The pilot did a "go-around" - but tracked the wrong course as he climbed away from the runway.

"When people are tired, these mistakes happen," a second Emirates pilot said, referring to the Melbourne accident.

"There is a huge issue with fatigue."

A third pilot questioned whether Emirates took seriously the contents of any air safety reports filed by pilots.

[D Chan]

What annoyed me was the ATSB guy's reluctance to state that, due to the apparent damage to the pressure bulkhead and the full thickness damage to the aircraft's skin, it is unlikely the aircraft would have pressurised and thus, it would not have been possible to proceed to Dubai!

They are not paid to speculate other than to investigate the evidences, establish the hard facts and provide recommendations to the industry for the improvement of safety etc.

[David M]

That's funny, because I've always found if you ask a stupid question, you'll often get a stupid answer

My favourite quote:

"There's no stupid questions, only stupid people"

David.M.

[Joseph Saragozza.]

A6-ERG tail strike has been a bit quiet lately. so i was wondering if there is anymore more news. i haven't had a chance to go to the airport to have a look to see if she still here or been flown to TLS for further repairs

it would be appreciated if i can get an update.
thanks.

[Chris Thurtell]

Was still outside JH hangars in MEL on saturday

[Andrew M]

http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25656948-2862,00.html

EMIRATES will pay an expected $100 million to repair a jet severely damaged in a near disastrous take-off incident at Melbourne Airport in March.

More at the link!

$100 Million to repair it and my mind instantly thinks of previous repair jobs on the tail end of an airplane.

Boeing much be charging too much for a 777-300ER these days.....

[Brian Wilkes]

Thats how you keep your rating 1 with the insurance company as Qantas did with it's 744 that visited the 19th hole at BKK!

[Dan Hammond]

Was still outside JH hangars in MEL on saturday

Apparently it did some engine runs in preperation for its flight overseas

[Carsten Bauer]

Heard that it will be flying MEL-PER unpressurised, then onto OMDB.

[Marty H]

Apparently it did some engine runs in preperation for its flight overseas


Yes correct it was doing engine runs on Wednesday night, she was positioned outside the JH Hangars yesterday.

[Dan Hammond]

Heard that it will be flying MEL-PER unpressurised, then onto OMDB.

I Also heard that too Carsten, I heard it will fly there and stay there overnight before leaving the country.

And thanks for the confirmation Marty

[Gerard M]

From another forum most of you read but for those who don't, it has departed as EK7608 for Perth.

Cheers
Gerard

[Greg Wood]

Departed Melbourne at 11.32hrs (AEST) as flight EK7608 and is scheduled to arrived into Perth at 14.10hrs (WST). It will overnight before departing to Dubai tommorrow (unpressurised due composite rear bulkhead damage) Greg

[Radi K]

Nice slow way to get to Perth and what a view on this route @ 10,000ft!

[Greg Wood]

Departed Melbourne at 11.32hrs (AEST ) and landed at Perth at 14.18hrs (WST) as flight UAE7608 to ITB bay 52.
Cheers Greg

[Fabian Lee]

Any info if she will be landing in SIN for refuelling? Thank you.

[Michael Mak]

Fabian, it will stop at SIN after DPS. Quoted from the newspaper (http://http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25656948-2862,00.html) article posted by Andrew M:
Senior pilots have said the low-altitude, four-day flight will consume copious quantities of fuel and cause the pilots to put down in Bali, Singapore, Dubai and Cairo before the final leg along the Mediterranean Sea to France.Apparently it is heading to Toulouse.

[Fabian Lee]

Thanks Michael for the information.

[Greg Wood]

Its scheduled to depart Perth this morning at 09.00hrs (WST) as flight UAE7608 flying NON-STOP to Dubai with a flight time of 16hrs and flying at FL100.

[Montague S]

I flew SYD-PER lastnight and it was well over 5hrs, be a long day in the sky for the guys at EK, anyway, I will pop out and get some pics of her.

[Fabian Lee]

Its scheduled to depart Perth this morning at 09.00hrs (WST) as flight UAE7608 flying NON-STOP to Dubai with a flight time of 16hrs and flying at FL100.

Pardon my ignorance, but do you know what technical changes they made to ERG that now make flying non-stop at FL100 for 16h possible? After all it was originally supposed to make multiple fuel stops cos of high fuel consumption at FL100. Thank you.

[Montague S]

Certainly is flying nonstop, its well within range and I don't think fuel cost is really an issue.

[Montague S]

http://i41.tinypic.com/250s9if.jpg

departed just before 10am.

[Greg Wood]

Fabian Lee,

Im sorry I don't know the answer to your question, It rotated early off the main North / South runway 03/21 (you can see photo on JS/Perth) great capture there by Monty Smith who ventured out in most unpleasant weather conditions to see it go. Emirates usually use A463 as there flight routing out from Perth so Im guessing this is / was the routing it took.
Checking the Dubai Airport's arrivals monitor, it shows the aircraft scheduled to arrive at 18.30hrs (LT) today 20/06 into terminal 3, the flight nature quotes: Pax extra - whatever that means. Cheers Greg

[Fabian Lee]

Thanky you, Greg for providing all the info. Fabian

[Chris Roope]

Could it have done the flight at normal flight levels but with the pilots on oxygen? Can see it making that flight at FL100 without fuelling stops.

[Michael Mak]

Doesn't the oxygen only last for 20-30 minutes? Either way, they won't be available for the 16 hours. Beside if the aircraft climbs to its normal cruising altitude, wouldn't it cause further structural damage?

[Owen H]

Depending on the aircraft type Michael, whether it is bottled or chemical generator oxygen in terms of the passenger cabin.

The pilots have a seperate system of bottled oxy, and if you needed to do a ferry flight I'm sure you could have additional bottles fitted.

That said I'm not sure what level they're planning to do it at.

[Montague S]

landed at 1920 local time in DXB.

[Stephen B]

No, a 16 hour unpressurised flight on oxygen would be impossible if not illegal.

You would run into pressure difficulties, the same as being under water for extended periods. As well as that it would be a multiple crew flight, requiring an interesting oxygen set up, and the crew also have to be able to eat, drink, and blow their noses! Can't do that with a mask on.

[Greg Wood]

The aircraft landed albeit 30 mins late arriving at 19.00hrs (LT) Flight time roughly calculated to have been 13hrs.50mins. Cheers Greg

[Brenden S]

Spoke with the refueler today, he said it was the ruski boys from volga who flew the aircraft back. It also took full tanks, 240t of fuel or something like that.

[Andrew P]

said it was the ruski boys from volga who flew the aircraft back.

And with a copy of the Idiots Guide on how to fly an A345 on their laps.

[Oliver Gigacz]

Here it is arriving in to Toulouse

http://www.pictaero.com/en/pictures/picture,46847

[Tony P]

And with a copy of the Idiots Guide on how to fly an A345 on their laps.

Did Rove write that one for you?:rolleyes:

[Dan Hammond]

Thanks for the link to the photo Oliver

[Owen H]

Its amazing how the media go for the "hero" angle whenever it is a foreign airline isn't it!

[Andrew M]

So the Pilot who APPARENTLY didn't notice the 100t difference in the weight that was programmed by the co-pilot is a hero because seconds before crashing pressed the "get me the heck off the ground button" :rolleyes:

[Ryan Hothersall]

Or known as "slam the throttles to the firewall and pray" button.

Misjudging the weight error would have to be one of the oldest mistakes in the book.

[Grant Smith]

Misjudging the weight error would have to be one of the oldest mistakes in the book.

Armchair expertise at its finest..

It's amazing what you can forget to do with only 3 hours sleep..

[Fred C]

A: Hindsight is wonderful.:)

B: Imagine the 300 or so passengers at the airport being told that "Sorry, tonights flight will not be leaving because the Captain is too tired. Please proceed calmly and quietly to the desk for hotel allocation." There would have been a riot. We have seen what happens in Perth when a QF flight was delayed because of a lightning strike.:(

C: The Captain is not the only person flying the aeroplane. (Yes the buck stops with him), however there is another fully qualified pilot next to him and possibly another two in the flight deck for take off.

Things are never quite as simple as I am too tired. Not going. I'd also suggest that if he pulled that it would have been his last flight with the airline. You have to look at management, cultures etc. Would the company have backed him up,supported him, with his too tired decision?

[Montague S]

Although there would have probably been repercussions internally for the Captain, it is my view he was negligent operating in the first instance. He should have reported fatigued and not operated that night. It is unrealistic for a person to believe they are refreshed and alert after only 3 hours of sleep and expect to operate a long haul jetliner.

Considering his experience and aptitude, I would have expected better decision making on his part.

I am more concerned with this then the actual incident.

totally disagree, your article points out that he was already at his limit for the month, why is management rostering someone at their limit? and why on earth are the tech crew given just over 30 hrs to recover from a 14hr flight? only to schedule them on another 14hr flight.

[Fred C]

I guess that makes it acceptable then to operate an aircraft even if you are fatigued.

No not really acceptable. The company can talk all about fatigue management and tell you everyone is aware and had training, but when their multi million dollar jet is not coming over the fence as planned and is costing a few extra million in delays and hotel bills then they tend to ask questions. Like why did you only have three hours sleep?

All I am saying is it might seem a nice easy question, am I too tired to fly, but there is so much else at play.

[Montague S]

14 hrs in a plane crossing 6 timezones then doing it all again a day and a half later is a recipe for trouble...anyone thinking otherwise is deluded.

[James K]

Agree. It's bad enough working an around the clock roster on the ground let alone crossing time zones and sleeping in a strange bed etc.

[Marty H]

The same crew will not be 'at the controls' for the full 14hr duration of the flight, a crew will be at the controls from pre-flight until 3-4hrs into the flight and will then be 'relieved' by another crew during cruise for perhaps the next 6-7hrs and then they will swap over again and that crew will then be at the controls until arrival at the gate.

[Philip Argy]

How does EK's duty pattern compare with other long haul carriers?

[Montague S]

The same crew will not be 'at the controls' for the full 14hr duration of the flight, a crew will be at the controls from pre-flight until 3-4hrs into the flight and will then be 'relieved' by another crew during cruise for perhaps the next 6-7hrs and then they will swap over again and that crew will then be at the controls until arrival at the gate.


Well aware of that and that isn't the issue, the issue is the fact that pilots are sent out to cross 6 timezones, and sent back less than 2 days later, no way in the world can someone be fully rested let alone confidently responsible for the lives of 300 behind them.

[Greg McDonald]

Bit more published today:

AN Airbus A340-500 carrying 275 people vanished from sight and was invisible on airport radar screens immediately after a botched take-off at Melbourne airport, in which it came within seconds of disaster.
For a few terrifying moments, those on duty in the airport's control tower had no way of knowing the fate of Emirates Airlines flight 407 after it limped into the air and flew low over houses in the densely populated suburb of Keilor on March 20, The Weekend Australian reports.

The Emirates plane, bound for Dubai, struggled to take off and then gain altitude after one of its pilots wrongly calculated the weight of the aircraft by 100tonnes.

The tail of the plane hit the runway five times before the captain ordered full thrust at the last minute to lift the Airbus over the airport perimeter fence, knocking out a strobe light and an antenna on the way.

A preliminary report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureaufound pilot error was to blame for the accident, which has been described as the closest Australia has come to a major airline disaster.

But now Rob Mason, president of the air traffic controllers union, Civil Air, has revealed that after take-off, the low-flying Airbus disappeared from view of the airport control tower.

"The aircraft was lost to sight against the lights of the industrial estate to the south -- it was not high enough to be seen," Mr Mason told The Weekend Australian.

He said air traffic controllers noticed something was wrong when the plane was halfway down the runway.

"My members told me the aircraft was not accelerating normally,' he said.

"Then they saw sparks coming from the back of the aircraft as its tail struck the ground as it tried to become airborne."

Sources say that after leaving the airport the Airbus still struggled to climb quickly, meaning it did not immediately show up on the control tower's radars, which show an aircraft only when it has reached take-off height.

"This would have been the worst civil air disaster in Australia's history by a very large margin," said aviation expert Ben Sandilands.

[Philip Argy]

... the control tower's radars ... show an aircraft only when it has reached take-off height ...

:confused:

[Adam G]

The actual article is here -

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,28124,26056145-23349,00.html

The actual artice doesn't contain the above quoted remark - it appears to just be in the secondary one.

[Daniel M]

....said aviation expert Ben Sandilands.

:rolleyes: Pffft hardly....more like a shock-journo, much like his same-surname mate

[Nathan Long]

And what is "take-off height" anyway? The height at which the aircraft becomes airborne (i.e. ground level)? :)

[Raymond Rowe]

That land at the end of runway 34 at tullamarine was never meant to be built on. But typical of the greed in this day and age has seen it sold off.It will only be a period of time until an aircraft plows into these buildings.

[Karl M]

That land at the end of runway 34 at tullamarine was never meant to be built on. But typical of the greed in this day and age has seen it sold off.It will only be a period of time until an aircraft plows into these buildings.


Unless the aircraft turns or its a windy day, then it could hit some factories.

There are still no buildings directly under the flight path at the end of RWY 34!
Nearest is about 3km away!

[Ryan Hothersall]

If the aircraft failed to take off from runway 34, it would clean up anything driving on Sunbury road and end up in a blazing heap in the field near to Uniting road.

[Bernie P]

Sorry to bring this thread back up, but it appears she has been fixed!!!

A6-ERG (http://www.skyliner-aviation.de/viewphoto.main?LC=nav2&picid=6138) being towed (maybe to paint?)

[Philip Argy]

Watch this space. http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2009/alert/2009_20.aspx

[Philip Argy]

On 20 March 2009, at 2230:49 Eastern Daylight-saving Time (1130:49 UTC), an Airbus A340-541 aircraft, registered A6-ERG, commenced the take-off roll on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport, Vic. on a scheduled 14-hour passenger flight to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). Onboard the aircraft (operating as flight number EK407) were 257 passengers, 14 cabin crew and 4 flight crew.
During the reduced thrust takeoff, the aircraft's tail made contact with the runway surface, but the aircraft did not begin to climb. The captain commanded and selected take-off and go-around engine thrust and the aircraft commenced a climb. After jettisoning fuel to reduce the landing weight, the flight crew returned the aircraft to Melbourne for landing.
The investigation has determined that the pre-flight take-off performance calculations were based on an incorrect take-off weight that was inadvertently entered into the take-off performance software on a laptop computer used by the flight crew. Subsequent crosschecks did not detect the incorrect entry and its effect on performance planning.
As a result of this accident, the aircraft operator has undertaken a number of procedural, training and technical initiatives across its fleet and operations with a view to minimising the risk of a recurrence. In addition, the aircraft manufacturer has released a modified version of its performance-planning tool and is developing a software package that automatically checks the consistency of the flight data being entered into the aircraft's flight computers by flight crews.
The investigation has found a number of similar take-off performance-related incidents and accidents around the world. As a result, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has initiated a safety research project to examine those events. The findings of that project will be released by the ATSB once completed. In the interim, the ATSB has drawn this interim report to the attention of relevant Australian operators to highlight the risks when calculating and checking take-off performance information.


The full report is available at http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1290040/ao2009012_interim.pdf