Edward Terry
18th June 2009, 10:30 AM
In today's Herald Miranda Devine writes an opinion piece (http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/too-late-to-reboot-when-in-the-air-20090617-chtq.html) raising questions about the A380's safety and reliability. She attempts to explain a string of incidents involving Airbus aircraft by an ever-increasing reliance on electronic systems.
I found a few of her claims dubious:
- "premium business passengers are demanding to be on the old Boeing 747". Not long ago Qantas claimed that its load factors on the A380, especially in the premium classes, were higher than the fleet-wide average, which goes against her assertion, backed up by one nameless 'insider'.
- "... computer glitch which led to a tail strike involving a United Arab Emirates Airbus A340-500 during take-off at Melbourne Airport. The investigation found an incorrect weight had been inadvertently entered..." If entering the data wrongly is indeed the reason behind the incident, then it is wrong to attribute it to a "computer glitch". Furthermore, she contradicts herself on this point in the space of a few paragraphs: on the one hand she says that in emergencies “computers override pilots” but on the other says that the Emirates pilots’ ability to “override the computer and apply maximum thrust” allowed them to avoid disaster.
- "Just this January, flight engineers were phased out of Qantas flight decks because their functions had been automated." While it is strictly correct that since January there have been no flight engineers in the Qantas fleet, this statement ignores the fact that aircraft have been flying without flight engineers for decades. It wrongly correlates the absence of flight engineers with a (perceived) decline in safety standards.
The article attempts to show that the reason behind the unreliability of the Qantas A380 (and in the same breath, Airbus in general) is an over-reliance on buggy electronics, but then quietly concedes that “747s had similar teething problems when they were introduced by Boeing”.
The inconsistencies and factual errors in the article make me think that this is just an attempt by an armchair expert (ahem… me included :)) to explain away a complex technical problem.
I found a few of her claims dubious:
- "premium business passengers are demanding to be on the old Boeing 747". Not long ago Qantas claimed that its load factors on the A380, especially in the premium classes, were higher than the fleet-wide average, which goes against her assertion, backed up by one nameless 'insider'.
- "... computer glitch which led to a tail strike involving a United Arab Emirates Airbus A340-500 during take-off at Melbourne Airport. The investigation found an incorrect weight had been inadvertently entered..." If entering the data wrongly is indeed the reason behind the incident, then it is wrong to attribute it to a "computer glitch". Furthermore, she contradicts herself on this point in the space of a few paragraphs: on the one hand she says that in emergencies “computers override pilots” but on the other says that the Emirates pilots’ ability to “override the computer and apply maximum thrust” allowed them to avoid disaster.
- "Just this January, flight engineers were phased out of Qantas flight decks because their functions had been automated." While it is strictly correct that since January there have been no flight engineers in the Qantas fleet, this statement ignores the fact that aircraft have been flying without flight engineers for decades. It wrongly correlates the absence of flight engineers with a (perceived) decline in safety standards.
The article attempts to show that the reason behind the unreliability of the Qantas A380 (and in the same breath, Airbus in general) is an over-reliance on buggy electronics, but then quietly concedes that “747s had similar teething problems when they were introduced by Boeing”.
The inconsistencies and factual errors in the article make me think that this is just an attempt by an armchair expert (ahem… me included :)) to explain away a complex technical problem.